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ABSTRACT 
An increasing number of people are using microblogs to 
broadcast their thoughts in real time as they watch televised 
political events. Microblogging social network sites (SNSs) 
such as Twitter generate a parallel stream of information 
and opinion. It is presumed that the additional content 
enhances the viewing experience, but our experiment 
explores the validity of this assumption. We studied how 
tweeting, or passively observing Twitter during a debate, 
influenced affect, recall and vote decision. For most 
measures, participants’ average feeling and recall toward 
the candidates did not depend on Twitter activity, but 
Twitter activity did matter for vote choice. People who 
actively tweeted changed their voting choice to reflect the 
majority sentiment on Twitter. Results are discussed in 
terms of the possibility that active tweeting leads to greater 
engagement but that it may also make people more 
susceptible to social influence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social networking sites (SNSs), like Facebook and Twitter, 
have become important tools in the realm of political 
information seeking, deliberation and decision making. A 
recent survey by the Pew Internet and American Life 
project [24] found that 25% of respondents said they used 
SNSs to discuss or debate political issues with others. 
Thirty percent of respondents said that their friends post 
occasionally about politics, and 25% said that they have 
become more involved politically as the result of 
information in their social networking feeds. 
The study of the use of social media to obtain and discuss 
political information and candidates has become an active 
research topic in the HCI and CSCW community. Several 
types of social media have been studied like political blogs 
[1, 9, 38, 40], discussion forums [23], online videos [18, 
19], and pure SNSs like Facebook and Twitter [14, 25, 26, 
27]. Twitter, a popular microblogging SNS, has more 
recently received particular attention by the research 
community in the context of political discourse. Tumasjan 
and colleagues [39] found that sentiment and political topic 
distribution on Twitter reflect the same patterns as “real-
world” sentiment and topic. Designers have begun to 
discuss how sentiment and content on Twitter might be 
visualized during live events, like debates, to enhance the 
experience [7]. In this paper, we wish to understand the 
cognitive and affective experiences of using Twitter during 
a live political event from the perspective of the individual. 
Media hybridity  
In mass media research, watching television has 
traditionally been viewed as a solitary and passive activity 
[30]. However, people are now appropriating interactive 
media during television broadcasts to create a hybrid media 
environment. The rise of the Internet has allowed more 
people to become “networked” viewers who capitalize on 
the web’s interactivity and connectivity to augment their 
television viewing experience. For example, according to a 
recent Pew Internet and American Life project survey, 
about 20% of cellphone owners who use the Internet, e-mail 
or apps have also used their phone to see what other people 
are saying online about a TV program they are watching 
[35]. The same percentage used their phone to post their 
own comments online [35]. Watching a televised event 
while connecting with others to talk about the event blurs 
the line between the one-to-many broadcast audience and 
the many-to-many networked audience [16].  
Twitter use during political debates  
Twitter is a form of lightweight chat that allows users to 
send short messages in real time to people subscribed to 
their streams. Twitter messages—or “tweets”—can only be 
140 characters or less, and can be sent or retrieved using a 
variety of technologies like laptops and mobile phones. 
One main feature of Twitter is the use of the ‘@’ symbol, 
followed by a user name, i.e. @username, within the text of 
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a message. The use of the ‘@’ symbol is also referred to as 
an @reply or an @mention, where the message is directed 
to a specific user or talking about a user. Another major 
feature of Twitter is the use of the ‘#’ symbol—hashtag—
followed by a keyword like #PresidentialDebate. When 
people compose a tweet that includes a hashtag, the 
message text is available to the public (barring privacy 
settings) and will be available to anyone who is searching 
for any given hashtag and keyword combination. The tweet 
feeds for hashtag searches are updated while tweets are 
being posted by Twitter users.  
Because Twitter allows people to broadcast their thoughts 
in real time, people have used it to interact with others 
during televised political events. This makes watching a 
debate a social experience and generates a parallel stream 
of information and opinion that augments the debating 
candidates’ words. Media and campaigns often encourage 
this activity by suggesting hashtags and mentions that 
microblogging participants can use. Several studies have 
examined the role of microblogging during political debates 
[17, 32, 33, 34]. Mascaro and Goggins [17], for example, 
found that communities coalesced around hashtags, where 
tweeters could interact with political officials and 
journalists. Shamma et al. [32] studied the use of Twitter 
during President Obama’s inauguration and found that 
tweet activity declined during critical moments, as people 
were more preoccupied with witnessing the event on 
television than tweeting about it.  
Much of the research on social influence on microblogging 
platforms has used Social Network Analysis (SNA) to study 
massive Twitter data sets [2, 4, 11, 13, 21, 29]. Cha, 
Haddadi, Benevenuto and Gummadi [4] found that the 
number of retweets and mentions reflect a different kind of 
influence than the number of followers. Huberman, 
Romero, and Wu [11] also found that interactional 
measures may provide a more accurate reflection of a social 
network than bond-based ties (follower-followee 
relationships). As further support for these findings, a study 
by Romero, Galuba, Asur and Huberman [28] found that 
influence depends not only on the size of an audience, but 
also on how active or passive the audience members are. As 
a way to predict influence, Anger and Kittl [2] proposed a 
quantitative method that not only included the number of 
followers, but also the frequency of retweets and mentions. 
While much of the research on social influence and Twitter 
has analyzed large data sets, experiments have the potential 
to show the complex way in which people are influenced on 
the individual level. Zhu, Huberman and Luon [42] 
conducted a series of online experiments to gauge social 
influence in which they asked participants to choose 
between a pair of images with and without knowledge of 
others' opinions. They found that social influence caused 
users to switch their choice, although the effect was 
nuanced: social influence was stronger for delayed 
decisions and in situations where users faced a moderate, 
instead of a large, number of opposing opinions. 
In a field experiment, we examined the influence of using 
Twitter during a political debate on users’ affect, cognition 
and vote choice. This is the first of this type of study, as far 
as we are aware. The power of an experiment is two-fold. 
One, through random assignment, we eliminate self-
selection bias. Second, we attempt to control the 
information available during the debate by asking 
participants to view the debate on a particular channel and, 
for those who are viewing Twitter, to view a particular 
hashtag feed.  We maintained external validity by asking 
participants to use Twitter while viewing the debate in their 
natural environments.   
While our exploratory study was not guided by hypotheses, 
we held a general belief that using Twitter while watching a 
debate would influence voters’ affect, cognition and vote 
decision. We compared people who could tweet to those 
who viewed content passively in order to understand how 
engagement might influence the way users feel, think and 
vote.  Our research questions were:  
RQ1: Does exposure to Twitter influence feelings toward 
political candidates and is this different for people who 
actively tweet versus those who passively monitor Twitter? 
RQ2: Does exposure to Twitter influence what is learned 
about political candidates and is this different for people 
who actively tweet versus those who passively monitor 
Twitter? 
RQ3: Does exposure to Twitter influence vote choice and is 
this different for people who actively tweet versus those 
who passively monitor Twitter?  
METHOD 
Participants 
Fifty-one Twitter users, 29 women and 22 men, participated 
in the study. They were recruited through multiple methods 
and sites. These included our laboratory's Twitter feed, 
recruitment fliers and in-class recruitment on the University 
of Hawai`i at Mānoa campus, in-person recruitment at local 
community meetings for the general public, and an e-mail 
newsletter announcement distributed via a local online 
newspaper. Participants were included only if they were in 
Hawaii, familiar with Twitter (held a Twitter account and 
had posted at least one tweet), and had agreed to watch a 
candidate debate on a specific date. Participants were 
compensated with a $20 gift card for participating on the 
night of the debate and an additional $10 gift card for 
participating in a follow-up online questionnaire two weeks 
later.  
The participants represented a diversity of age categories. 
Eleven participants were 18 to 20 years old, 19 were 21 to 
29 years old, 11 were 30 to 39 years old, 6 were 40 to 49 
years old, and 4 were 50 or older. Ninety-two percent had 
completed at least some college, and 46% had completed at 
least some graduate school. Twenty-three people, or nearly 
half of our respondents, reported being Independent or 
Non-Partisan. Twenty-three participants identified as 
Democrats and four identified as Republican. The average 
participant's political interest was moderately high. The 
means, minimums and maximums for political interest and 
Twitter use are shown in Table 1.  
Most of the participants were daily users of Twitter. About 
80 percent looked at Twitter at least once a day, and about 
half of the participants posted a tweet daily. To get a sense 
of participants' political activity on Twitter, we asked them 
to rate how frequently they looked at Twitter to learn about 
politics. Interestingly, a majority of participants never or 
rarely went to Twitter for political information, yet 60 
percent said they stumbled upon political tweets on a daily 
basis even when they were not looking for them. 
Frequency Mean Min Max 
Look at Twitter (1=Never) 4.08 1 5 
Tweet (1=Never) 3.49 1 5 
Political Interest (1=Very low) 3.48 1 5 
Stumble upon political tweets 
(1=Never) 
3.62 1 5 
Go to Twitter to learn about 
politics (1=Never) 2.62 1 5 
Tweet about politics (1=Never) 2.02 1 5 
Table 1: Participant demographics on 1-5 scales. 
Setting 
We conducted the study during the November 2012 U.S. 
election. Rather than expose participants to an election they 
were unfamiliar with, we wanted to present them with an 
election they may care about. In some of our previous 
laboratory studies on social media and political 
deliberation, we exposed participants to content related to 
an election in a different part of the United States. But the 
participants shared in post-experiment interviews that the 
material was not relevant to them, saying for example: 
 "… I was just not really caring because we previously said 
it’s not in Hawaii. So, it’s just like if it doesn’t apply to me, 
I shouldn’t, I don’t really care."  
To ameliorate this issue, our field experiment approach 
raised external validity by asking participants to learn about 
real candidates they would be eligible to vote for – with the 
hope that it would increase engagement with the study 
material. 
We selected the election to replace Hawaii’s U.S. Senator 
Daniel Akaka, who was retiring after serving 22 years in 
the Senate. Two locally well-known politicians were vying 
for his seat: sitting U.S. Congresswoman Mazie Hirono 
(Democratic party candidate), who also served two terms as 
Hawaii's lieutenant governor, and former two-term Hawaii 
Governor Linda Lingle (Republican party candidate). We 
chose this race due to its prominence in local politics as 
well as its visibility on the national stage. The October 16, 
2012, debate was the second of five debates between 
Hirono and Lingle. It took place three weeks prior to the 
November 6 general election and lasted one hour. A local 
news station and a local online newspaper hosted the event. 
Design 
Three independent groups were formed based on their 
interaction with Twitter: 
• Tweeters: Tweeters watched the debate and tweeted 
whenever and whatever they pleased. In this condition, 
we asked participants to log in to their personal Twitter 
accounts and start by searching #kitvdebate. We asked 
them to actively tweet during the debate using the 
hashtag #kitvdebate. 
• Twitter Observers: Twitter observers watched the 
debate and monitored the Twitter stream, but did not 
tweet. In this condition, we asked participants to log in 
to their personal Twitter accounts and start by 
searching #kitvdebate. We asked them to monitor 
Twitter during the debate but refrain from tweeting. 
• No Twitter (Control): Participants in this condition 
watched the debate and did not look at Twitter.  
Measures of affect, knowledge, memory, and vote choice 
(described below) were taken at three different times 
relative to the debate: pre-debate, immediately after the 
debate, and two weeks after the debate. 
Thus the design for most analyses was a 3x3 mixed design 
with independent groups defined by their level of 
interaction with Twitter and repeated measures defined by 
the times at which measurements were taken. 
At all three times (pre-debate, immediately following the 
debate, and two weeks after the debate), dependent 
measures were taken on knowledge, affect, and voting 
preferences. Recall was taken at only the second and third 
times (as there would have been nothing to recall prior to 
the debate).  Dependent measures were as follows:  
• Knowledge of the race. Participants were asked to “Please 
indicate your general knowledge level of the 2012 U.S. 
Senate election in Hawaii" and given the response choices 
of 1=No knowledge to 5=Very high knowledge. 
• Knowledge of the candidate. Participants were asked to 
“Please indicate your knowledge about each candidate." 
Next to the candidate names, the following response 
choices were provided: 1= “No knowledge” to 5= “Very 
high knowledge.” 
• Feeling thermometer. Subjects were asked to rate the 
candidates on a “feeling thermometer” with the response 
choices of 1=“Cold” to 7=“Warm.” Feeling thermometers 
are commonly used in research on attitudes toward political 
candidates [41]. 
• Liking the candidate. Subjects were asked to “Please 
indicate how much you like/dislike this candidate” using 
the response scale of 1=“Dislike very much” to 5=“Like 
very much.” This item was used as a means of comparison 
against the feeling thermometer indicator, which also 
assessed how much respondents liked a candidate. 
• Likelihood of voting for candidate. Subjects were asked to 
“Please indicate how likely it is that you would vote for this 
candidate” using the response scale of 1=“Definitely would 
not,” to 5=“Definitely would.” 
• Feeling toward the candidate. Participants were asked to 
rate the candidates on five affective terms: “angry,” 
“hopeful,” “afraid,” “proud,” and “anxious”. The first four 
items on the checklist were used in the American National 
Election Studies, and “anxious” was added per Marcus, 
Neuman and MacKuen [15]. The checklist questions were 
in the form “When you think about <candidate name>, how 
<affect term> does she make you feel?” The response scale 
ranged from 1=“Not <affect term> at all,” to 5=“Extremely 
<affect term>.”   
• Vote. Participants were asked, "If the 2012 U.S. Senate 
election were held today, whom would you vote for?" using 
the responses 1="Mazie Hirono" and 2="Linda Lingle." 
• Recall. The dependent measures for recall were asked as 
the following two free response items: 
• Debate recall. Participants were asked to "Please 
write down as many things as you can remember from 
the debate. Recall from memory without using any 
reminders (i.e. open tabs, other windows) or asking 
anyone who might be with you."  
• Twitter recall. In addition to the debate recall, 
participants who looked at Twitter were also asked to 
"Please write down as many things as you can 
remember from Twitter during the debate. Recall from 
memory without using any reminders (i.e. open tabs, 
other windows) or asking anyone who might be with 
you."  
For the recall measures, the free response entry field for 
each question was 20 lines long and 100 characters wide. 
We asked participants not to worry about spelling, 
punctuation or complete sentences and recommended they 
spend about 10 minutes on each free recall response. 
• Tweets. All of the public tweets that included the 
#kitvdebate hashtag during the debate were collected using 
the streaming Twitter API. We also used the streaming API 
to collect all of the tweets posted by the participants during 
the debate. We conducted a sentiment analysis of the tweets 
about each candidate to code for positive, negative or 
neutral sentiment.  We identified tweets that mentioned the 
candidates by first querying the candidates’ names, 
including possible misspellings and wildcards to capture 
non-exact matches (i.e., possessives and hashtags).  The 
tweets were filtered into three groups: tweets that 
mentioned only Hirono, tweets that mentioned only Lingle 
and tweets that mentioned both candidates. If the tweet 
mentioned only one candidate, it was coded as having 
positive, negative or neutral sentiment about the candidate. 
If a tweet mentioned both candidates, two codes were 
assigned, including one for each candidate. We also coded 
the participants’ tweets to determine whether they declared 
a winner of the debate. 
Procedure 
Surveymonkey.com was used for the online consent form 
and all questionnaires. One hour before the debate, 
participants were e-mailed a link to directions and the pre-
exposure questionnaire. After completing the pre-exposure 
questionnaire, the participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the three Twitter conditions (without being told 
about the other conditions) and asked to prepare to watch 
the debate. All participants were asked to view the debate 
either on a televised broadcast on a specific local news 
channel or as a live stream on the station's website. 
Immediately after the debate, participants were e-mailed a 
link to an online post-exposure questionnaire, which they 
were required to complete within one hour. Two weeks 
after the debate, participants were again e-mailed a request 
to complete a follow-up online questionnaire. While it is 
possible that new information in the subsequent two weeks 
influenced the dependent measures, we concluded that if a 
major event disrupted the election, any influence would 
likely be similar across all of the groups.  
We asked participants in the Tweet and Twitter Observer 
groups to start by searching #kitvdebate on Twitter because 
the hashtag had been popular during a previous political 
debate that had aired on the same station. We intentionally 
exposed the Tweet and Twitter Observer groups to the same 
Twitter content to keep the conditions consistent while 
manipulating only their level of engagement with Twitter.  
Our intent was to insert our participants into the naturally 
occurring dialogue on Twitter. Use of the widely distributed 
#kitvdebate hashtag exposed the participants to enough 
voices to ensure inconspicuousness. Use of this hashtag 
also increased the study's external validity, exposing 
participants to the full diversity of voices – candidates' 
campaigns, news sources, advocacy groups and citizens – 
available to all Twitter users. In addition, because 
participants' perception of their audience influences their 
communicative acts [16], it was important that they knew 
the audience was real, broad, and consisted of other Twitter 
users watching the debate (including those outside of our 
study).  
RESULTS 
Rating Scales 
Rating scale data was analyzed using a 3x3 mixed design 
Analysis of Variance, with the exception of the recall data 
which was analyzed using a 3x2 mixed-design Analysis of 
Variance. Missing data was replaced by the mean of the 
relevant scale across all participants, regardless of 
condition. No more than four values were replaced for any 
scale.  
Since we used six rating scale dependent measures in the 
same 3x3 design (knowledge of the race, knowledge of the 
candidate, feeling thermometer, liking, and likelihood of 
voting), we applied the Bonferroni correction for multiple 
significance tests when considering this data. With this 
correction, experimentwise significance at p<.05 will 
require p<.008 (.05/6). This correction was applied to all 
ANOVAs discussed below. 
The descriptive statistics for the rating scales suggest the 
data were fairly normally distributed. Skewness ranged 
from -.895 to 1.83, and kurtosis ranged from -1.30 to 3.12, 
which are within normal limits. The standard deviation 
ranged from .85 to 1.85, which is normal given a 5-point or 
7-point scale. 
Over time, subjects grew more angry about Hirono, 
F(2,96)=17.545, p<.001 (means = 1.61, 2.44, and 2.12 for 
pre-exposure, immediate post-exposure, and two-week post 
exposure, respectively) and more afraid regarding Hirono, 
F(2,96)=7.275, p=.001 (means = 1.65, 2.12, and 1.80 for 
pre-exposure, immediate post-exposure, and two-week post 
exposure, respectively), and more anxious, F(2,96)=5.543, 
p<.01 (means = 1.81, 2.28, and 2.04 for pre-exposure, 
immediate post-exposure, and two-week post exposure, 
respectively). 
Other rating scale measures were not significant. 
 
Vote choice 
The vote choice dependent measure was a dichotomous 
category choice (Hirono or Lingle), thus the data was 
analyzed in terms of frequencies of participants who chose 
one or the other candidate and tested using the chi-square 
statistic.   
Table 2 shows the raw frequencies of subjects in all three 
Twitter groups who reported that they would vote for the 
Democrat (Hirono) or the Republican (Lingle) before, 
immediately after, and two weeks after the debate (four 
subjects were removed from this analysis for missing data).  
  
Figure 1: Percentage of participants in the three Twitter 
groups who changed their vote immediately after  
and two weeks after the debate.  
Figure 1 expresses this data as the percentage of 
participants in the three Twitter groups who changed their 
vote (in either direction) immediately after the debate and 
two weeks later. The Tweet group had far more changes 
than the other groups, especially immediately but also after 
a delay. A chi-square test on the change percentages shows 
a significant contingency between the Twitter group factor 
and the time measure, χ2(2)=27.9, p<.0001. In other words, 
active Tweeters were the most likely to change their 
position.   
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Table 2. Frequencies of participants across the three 
groups reporting their vote for the Democrat or 
Republican before, immediately after, and two weeks after 
the debate. 
Figure 2. Percentage of subjects in the three Twitter groups 
reporting that they would vote for the Republican before, 
immediately after, and two weeks after the debate. 
 
Figure 2 expresses the data as the percentage of Republican 
votes in each Twitter group at each time period. In Figure 2 
we note a strong movement in the active Tweet group 
toward the Republican candidate immediately after the 
debate, which was still present two weeks later.  
Even though the groups started out in different places (the 
Twitter Observers had more Republicans to begin with), 
there was room to see a similar change in the Twitter 
Observer group. 
A chi-square test shows a marginally significant 
contingency between the Twitter group factor and the time 
measure for the Republican percentage data, χ2(4)=8.35, 
p<.08. In other words, active Tweeters were the most likely 
to change their position toward the Republican candidate 
immediately, and this change was persistent. We examine 
reasons for this when we treat the content of the tweets in a 
subsequent section. 
Recall 
We analyzed the recall data using a method similar to 
grounded theory [37], with the goal of identifying what type 
of information was recalled and whether the types varied 
across conditions. We define recall as it has been defined in 
other studies [12]: all ideas presented in the free recall 
response, including opinions, personal stories and 
inaccurate memories.  Each participant's recall was split 
into idea units, which were often clauses that contained a 
subject and predicate. However, sometimes they were as 
short as a noun or as long as a phrase (if parts of the phrase 
failed to make sense when standing alone).  
A subset of the recall data was independently coded by two 
authors – not for final coding decisions but to identify 
situations where the coding scheme did not fit. One 
additional code was identified through this process and one 
was eliminated, and through iterative cycles of redefining 
the codes and reducing under axial coding, we 
collaboratively identified a set of 13 codes. 
The coders independently coded one third of the recall of 
the debate using Atlas.ti. Inter-rater reliability between the 
two coders was substantial (κ=.70). When the coders 
disagreed on coding a recall item, they discussed the 
discrepancy to come to an agreement. The first author 
coded the remaining two-thirds of the recall data.  
For brevity, we discuss only the seven codes that were used 
15 times or more. These included:  
• Candidate Tactics: comments about a candidate’s political 
ploys to influence the meaning of an event, issue or their 
opponent’s identity.  
• Political Views: comments about a candidate’s political 
behavior, opinions or platform issues.  
• Public speaking: comments about a candidate’s verbal and 
non-verbal communications skills. 
• Character: judgments of candidate’s integrity, personality.  
• Outside References: discussion of events that occurred 
outside of the debate itself including personal stories, 
current events and discussions that occurred on Twitter. 
• Final Impression: sweeping judgment about a candidate 
that summarizes a participant’s opinion on the candidate 
• Candidate Competence: judgments about a candidate’s 
experience, knowledge or understanding of a political topic, 
or ability to serve. 
The mean numbers of recall instances for each code 
category across all participants are shown in Figure 3. 
Participants most frequently recalled ideas about Candidate 
Tactics, Political Views and Public Speaking and Character. 
We analyzed the recall data using a 3x2 mixed-design 
Analyses of Variance. The two independent variables 
included group and time. 
There was a main effect of time for Candidate Tactics, 
F(1,45)=5.542, p<.05 (means = 3.77 and 2.50 for 
immediate post-exposure and two-week post exposure, 
respectively), and Character, F(1,45)=5.597, p<.05 (means 
= 1.00 and .542 for immediate post-exposure and two-week 
post exposure, respectively). Both decreased from the initial 
recall to the follow-up recall. 
The candidate competence recall showed a main effect of 
group, F(2,45)=3.20, p<.05 (means = .16, .67, and .12 for 
Tweet, Twitter Observer and No Twitter groups, 
respectively). In other words, Twitter Observers recalled 
more items in this category than the Tweeters and the No 
Twitter group. We found no significant difference between 
the groups for the other recall categories. 
 
Figure 3: Recall Counts by Code Type 
Tweet analysis 
We manually coded #kitvdebate tweets that explicitly 
mentioned the candidates during the debate. We collected 
407 tweets that were posted using the #kitvdebate hashtag 
during the hour-long debate. Of them, 303 mentioned at 
least one candidate’s name, including 102 tweets that 
mentioned both candidates. The average number of tweets 
posted by general Twitter users who used the #kitvdebate 
hashtag was 5.9 tweets. In comparison, Tweeters in our 
study posted an average of 9.5 tweets, almost double the 
number posted by all users who included the hashtag. 
The analysis showed that tweets about Lingle were mostly 
favorable and tweets about Hirono were mostly critical. 
Tweets that mentioned Lingle were 73 percent positive, 16 
percent negative and 11 percent neutral. Tweets that 
mentioned Hirono were 9 percent positive, 87 percent 
negative and 4 percent neutral. The percentages include 
tweets that mentioned one of the candidates or both of the 
candidates. More than a third of the tweets that mentioned 
both candidates were positive about Lingle and negative 
about Hirono. 
We also conducted an analysis of tweets posted by 
participants in the Tweet group to determine what they 
were tweeting during the debate. Our intention was to 
analyze not only what they saw (tweets posted using the 
#kitvdebate hashtag) but also what they said (participant 
tweets). While presenting a complete analysis is beyond the 
scope of this paper, we were interested in the extent to 
which participants were vocalizing their support for the 
candidates.  
We found that three of the four "vote switchers" in the 
Tweet condition posted a tweet declaring that Lingle won 
the debate. For example, one vote switcher used a well-
known local Pidgin English phrase to say that Lingle was 
winning the debate: "Linda is small kine killing it 
#kitvdebate." At about 43 minutes into the debate, another 
vote switcher in the Tweet group modified a retweet saying, 
"Me too. RT @username: i am a democrat and am 100% 
siding with Lingle #whatsithis #kitvdebate #hisen". In the 
last two minutes of the debate, the third vote switcher 
wrote: "Hirono needs to get to the point with concise 
responses! I think Lingle nailed it. #kitvdebate." The fourth 
vote switcher in the Tweet condition did not declare a 
debate winner and was the only participant who changed 
her vote back to Hirono two weeks after the debate. In other 
words, only the vote switchers who declared a debate 
winner on Twitter stuck with their new vote decision after 
two weeks. The three other Tweeters who posted a 
comment about Lingle winning the debate had voted for her 
prior to the debate and stuck with their vote two weeks 
later. 
DISCUSSION 
Our first research question was: Does exposure to Twitter 
influence feelings toward political candidates and is this 
different for people who actively Tweet versus those who 
passively monitor Twitter? We found no effects of Twitter 
exposure on our rating scales. All participants experienced 
a surge in negative feelings toward Hirono and positive 
feelings toward Lingle immediately after the debate, which 
eased with time but did not quite return to pre-debate levels. 
We therefore found no evidence to answer “yes” to this 
research question. 
The second research question was: Does exposure to 
Twitter influence what is learned about political candidates 
and is this different for people who actively Tweet versus 
those who passively monitor Twitter? We found only a 
main effect of Twitter group for the number of Candidate 
Competence recall items. Mondak and Huckfeldt [20] 
found that cues about candidate competence influence 
voting decision even when people receive clear signals 
about a candidate’s political party and ideology, which was 
the case in the debate study. However, recall about 
candidate competence comprised a small fraction of the 
total number of recall items, so it may not have wielded 
influence on feeling toward the candidates or vote decision. 
Our most interesting finding is related to our third research 
question: Does exposure to Twitter influence vote choice 
and is this different for people who actively Tweet versus 
those who passively monitor Twitter? We found that 
participants in the Tweet group were significantly more 
likely to change their vote decision immediately after the 
debate and to stick with their new vote decision two weeks 
later. By contrast, the Twitter Observer and No Twitter 
groups were less swayed by the debate. Their votes 
remained mostly unchanged after the debate and after the 
two-week delay. Thus, we can answer that active Tweeting 
seems to have more of an influence on vote choice than just 
exposure to Twitter, which in turn is not much different 
than no exposure to Twitter. 
We propose two possible explanations for the observed vote 
change in the Tweet group: The first explanation is that 
there existed increased engagement through the cognitive 
act of creating the messages–allowing for new viewpoints 
to form [8]. Eveland [8] notes that the act of participating in 
discussion presents the opportunity to process the 
information in new ways as it is re-synthesized to produce 
conversation with others. The reformulation and cognitive 
elaboration necessary for conversing can then lead to 
changes in attitude beyond that of those with solitary 
motives such as to privately view media [8, 31]. It may be 
that engagement matters beyond observation. Those who 
engaged in discussion may have processed the information 
more elaborately or in new ways compared to the other 
groups because they were expecting to engage in discussion 
with others. 
The second explanation is related to social influence, or, in 
this case, the majority sentiment on Twitter [5]. The 
#kitvdebate tweets were predominantly pro-Lingle (tweets 
that mentioned Lingle were 73 percent positive) and anti-
Hirono (tweets that mentioned Hirono were 87 percent 
negative). To better understand how prevalent group 
conformity was amongst people in the Twitter conditions 
(Tweeters and Twitter Observers), the lead author coded the 
Twitter recall data for mentions of a debate winner. We 
found that 16 of the 26 respondents who completed the 
initial recall mentioned a Twitter favorite in the debate. 
They told the same story: “most” or “many” people on 
Twitter praised Lingle or criticized Hirono. There was a 
similar consensus in the follow-up recall. This suggests that 
participants were cognizant of the majority opinion on 
Twitter. Research suggests that the greater the size of the 
majority, the more likely the minority will be to conform 
[3].  
Cialdini and Goldstein [5] describe how social influence, or 
peer pressure, can lead people to change their beliefs or 
behavior to reflect the group majority. Conformity tends to 
take two forms: informational and normative [5]. 
Informational conformity refers to privately changing your 
beliefs to reflect the opinions of credible others. Normative 
conformity means changing behavior to fit in to the crowd, 
even when this change is not accompanied by a private 
change in opinion [36]. 
If the Tweeters switched their opinion to reflect the 
opinions of people who they deemed to be credible, then 
this would be an example of informational conformity. On 
the other hand, tweeting about the popular candidate in 
order to attain social rewards would demonstrate normative 
conformity. There was some evidence of social pressure in 
the #kitvdebate tweet stream, which suggests the possibility 
of normative conformity. In cases where people showed 
positive sentiment towards Hirono, their posts were met 
with criticism (a reflection of group majority sentiment). 
For example, one person in the minority who tweeted 
"Hirono is schooling Lingle” met backlash: "Hirono isn't 
schooling anyone." When the Hirono supporter later wrote, 
"It's a wrap, Hirono's more genuine, logical and people-
oriented. Lingle's all tacticsdirty politics," someone else 
replied "R U on CRACK?"  
Interestingly, three of the four vote switchers declared on 
Twitter that Lingle was the debate winner. The vote 
switchers might have been expressing what they believe to 
be accurate information based on the opinions of 
knowledgeable others (informational conformity) or they 
may have been conforming to group norms even though it 
may not have been attached to a private change in opinion 
(normative conformity) [36].  The two types of conformity 
are frequently intertwined [6] and often work in tangent to 
maintain one's self-concept [5].  
For instance, the Tweeters may have declared Lingle as the 
debate winner to gain social acceptance at first (public 
compliance) but later changed their vote decision (private 
acceptance) to maintain a consistent self-concept. Twitter 
Observers could not commit to a new opinion publicly. 
They did not have the opportunity to conform to the group 
norm publicly and did need to modify their vote decision to 
keep their self-concept intact. We speculate that 
communicating their pro-Lingle sentiment may have 
furthered the group bond for the Tweeters and made them 
more likely to switch their vote to reflect the sentiment of 
the Twitter majority. 
Regardless of why engagement may have influenced the 
vote decision, it seems that being able to participate can 
lead to real change whereas merely observing may not. 
While social media has been criticized for having a 
polarizing effect [1], our study suggests that this is not 
always true. People’s vote decisions can be swayed, 
meaning confirmation bias does not always lead people to 
interpret information in a way that supports pre-existing 
beliefs [22]. While our study suggests that the majority may 
be able to sway the opinion of the minority, the reverse is 
not necessarily true. No one in the Tweet or Twitter 
Observer groups switched their vote from the Republican 
favorite on Twitter to the Democratic candidate. 
Implications for Theory  
Most of the research that has focused on microblogging 
during live political events has analyzed data on a macro 
scale [7, 29, 32, 33]. Few studies have studied the cognitive 
and affective effects of participation during political events 
on the microbloggers themselves. Although we did not find 
evidence that engaging on Twitter had any influence on 
what people knew or how they felt about the candidates, 
our study did suggest that Twitter engagement mattered 
when it came to vote choice. This indicates that the 
relationship between participation and action may be 
different from the relationship between participation and 
affect and intention.  
We found an interesting pattern in which vote switchers 
frequently declared a debate winner – a form of public 
commitment that may have been related to their decision-
making process. We suggest future studies include post-
experiment interviews to further examine the potential 
relationship between expressing a belief publicly and the 
decision-making process. 
Our study design allowed us to explore the private beliefs 
and feelings behind public communication on social media. 
While big data collection, SNA, and automated content 
analysis are effective in studying the nature of interaction 
on social media (behavior), experimental studies can show 
how the interaction influences the thoughts and feelings of 
users (cognition and affect). Moreover, while research 
methods such as SNA can study the content created by 
contributors, they cannot tell the stories of the countless 
people who do not post. Our study explores the experience 
of silent social media users by including the Twitter 
Observer group. Future work should investigate 
microblogging in different political contexts, including 
debates in which the political sentiment on Twitter is more 
even-handed, as well as in national debates. 
Implications for Practice 
Our study suggests that having the power to tweet about a 
political event may influence the tweeter’s vote decision in 
ways that reading tweets may not.  
We advanced two possible explanations for this: active 
participation heightened cognitive processing of the debate 
or it made the minority more susceptible to the influence of 
the majority opinion. These are not mutually exclusive. If 
the capacity to tweet led to more elaborate memories 
(which we did not find in this study), then tweeting could 
be viewed as a means to developing a more thoughtful 
electorate willing to listen to the political opposition. On the 
other hand, listening to the majority may increase cognitive 
processing of the debate, especially if the majority opinion 
is different from one’s own opinion. But this may not 
always be good for democracy. If active participation 
increases group conformity, then tweeting could be viewed 
as culprit in increased homogenization of political thought. 
It would also imply that at times decisions can be based on 
social rewards rather than accurate information, which 
threatens rational discourse in the public sphere [10].  We 
cannot determine which explanation is true based on our 
data. The stakes for democracy are high, which is why we 
believe more research must be conducted on how social 
media participation influences the way people think, act and 
vote. 
LIMITATIONS 
Our participants were more highly educated, more 
politically interested, more liberal and had more Twitter 
experience than the average U.S. citizen; thus, any 
generalizations are limited to this demographic. However, 
our study was designed to examine how the use of Twitter 
influenced a politically interested and technologically 
experienced group of Twitter users.    
Also, importantly, we have several limitations related to our 
experimental design that should be addressed in future 
work. Firstly, in our study, we randomly assigned 
participants to one of the three Twitter conditions. Despite 
using random assignment, the groups were different prior to 
the debate on at least one dimension that we cared about: 
the ratio of people who voted for the Democrat (Mazie 
Hirono) was higher in the Tweet and the No Twitter groups 
than in the Twitter Observer group. This may be an 
indication that our groups were different in a systematic 
way, which would mean that group differences rather than 
the treatment may have influenced the results. We attribute 
the randomization problem to our relatively small sample 
size. We feel it would be beneficial in future studies to use 
a larger sample size, which would likely yield groups that 
were more similar prior to the debate, or to use stratified 
randomization to control and balance the influence of 
covariates. Other potential covariates that we did not 
measure or account for include participants’ propensity to 
change their minds and their susceptibility to social 
influence. To address these issues, future studies should use 
existing, or develop new, measures for how willing people 
are to change their minds or be influenced by others. 
Secondly, this was an ‘in situ’ study that looked at how 
users behave and feel in their natural tweeting environment, 
increasing ecological validity.  However, as is the nature of 
this type of approach, the evidence of internal validity is 
harder to judge since we did not control participants’ 
behavior. We only controlled what we invited participants 
to do. For example, we do not know whether the 
participants watched and discussed the debate with others 
physically present with them, nor whether they viewed 
social media content beyond the assigned hashtag feed. 
Thus, it is possible that people beyond the #kitvdebate 
hashtag stream influenced feelings, knowledge and votes. 
We recommend that future field experiments monitor 
participants’ online and offline behavior more carefully. 
Future studies may also be conducted in a controlled 
laboratory setting, where participant behavior can be 
manipulated, albeit at the expense of ecological validity. 
Thirdly, the design of the study allowed Twitter Observers 
to view tweets posted by the Tweeters. Therefore, it is 
possible that the Twitter Observers were influenced by both 
their treatment and the treatment of the Tweet group. To 
control for this, interaction between groups can be 
prevented by artificially constructing simulations of 
identical but separate Twitter feeds for each group to view. 
Because the feeds would be experimental sandboxes, they 
would not be live nor would they be plugged into real world 
discourse. Again, ecological validity may decrease with this 
more controlled approach.   
Lastly, our participants’ political leanings may have 
contributed to the way in which our experiment unfolded. 
Twenty-three participants reported being Independent or 
Non-Partisan, 23 identified as Democrats and 4 identified 
as Republican. Because almost half of our respondents 
identified as Independent or Non-Partisan, our participants 
may have been more open to changing their vote decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
An increasing number of people are using social media to 
learn about and discuss politics, including microbloggers 
who provide live commentary about televised political 
debates. The result is a hybrid media environment in which 
anyone with an Internet connection can watch the 
conversation unfold or join the discussion. Our study 
suggests that people who intend to actively post may 
experience the debate differently than people who do not. 
In this experiment, we found that users who could 
contribute to the conversation on Twitter were more likely 
to switch their vote to reflect the majority. Additionally, it 
so happened that vote switching seemed to be related to a 
public declaration on Twitter of a debate victor. When 
people post, it is assumed that they have the capacity to 
influence others. But this study suggests that social media 
contributors may also have the power to influence 
themselves. 
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